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European Parliament elections are frequently criticised from the perspective that they suﬀer low
turnout levels and tend to be dominated by national rather than European political issues. Damien
Bol presents ﬁndings from a study on whether the creation of a Europe-wide electoral district,
elected via a pan-European list of candidates, could help engage EU citizens. He notes that while
there is great potential in this system as a mechanism for addressing the EU’s democratic deﬁcit, it
would need to be carefully calibrated to prevent the European Parliament from becoming dominated
by representatives of larger member states.
The EU is at a critical moment in its development. Many citizens express a negative attitude towards European
integration and do not trust European decision makers. A proposal that has been put forward to mitigate this
problem, and to help European representatives gain the conﬁdence of the population, is to create a pan-European
district in which a small number of MEPs would be elected.
In a recent paper we evaluated this proposal via a unique online experiment where we invited thousands of
Europeans to report how they would vote in a pan-European ballot. We ﬁnd that vote choice in a pan-European
district would be substantially aﬀected by the presence of national candidates on the lists. There are a number of
implications and recommendations for European decisions makers that can be derived from these ﬁndings.
The EuroVotePlus experiment
In the three weeks preceding the 2014 European Parliament election, we conducted an online experiment (for a
discussion of the details of this experiment, see this other paper). We created a multi-lingual website, open to all,
where users were invited to learn more about European elections in general, as well as the rules used to elect
MEPs, and to participate in an online voting experiment.
In the experimental part of the website, we invited people to indicate their vote preference in the upcoming European
election using the party lists present in their district. We also asked all participants, regardless of their country, to
indicate how they would vote if 10 additional members of the European Parliament were to be elected in a pan-
European district. We simulated a pan-European ballot by creating party lists based on the existing political groups
in the European Parliament. We randomly picked, for each respondent, 10 incumbent MEPs from each political
group. A screenshot of a pan-European ballot is presented below. The ballot contained the name of the candidate,
his/her nationality, and a picture.
Figure: A pan-European ballot paper
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Note: The ballot paper shown was randomly generated on the EuroVotePlus website.
Findings
In the pan-European ballot, people were invited to cast a vote under diﬀerent electoral rules. We ﬁrst asked them to
cast a vote under closed-list proportional representation for which they could only choose one list. Even if the
participants appeared to be ideologically driven, as they voted massively for the pan-European list corresponding to
the party they had the intention to vote for in the national ballot, they were strongly aﬀected by the nationality of the
candidates appearing on the list. They were 48 per cent more likely to vote for a list when there was a least one
candidate of their country.
We also asked them to vote under open-list proportional representation for which they could choose one list and
give extra points to individual candidates of this list. The eﬀects were similar to those observed under closed-list
proportional representation, but we observed that the participants were 8 times more likely to give a positive point to
candidates of their own nationality.
Recommendations
We derive two concrete recommendations for EU decision makers. First, if a pan-European district is created, we
recommend establishing a maximum number of candidates from each EU country on each of the lists. If this number
is not ﬁxed, pan-European parties, anticipating the eﬀect of the nationality of candidates on vote choice, would be
likely to nominate candidates from large countries.
Second, if a pan-European district is created, the argument developed in this article lends support to the
implementation of a closed-list PR system, instead of an open-list PR system. Since we ﬁnd that Europeans would
give more positive votes to national candidates, the open-list PR system would also lead to the domination of the
pan-European seats by large countries.
All in all, although we see great potential in creating a pan-European district to reduce the EU’s democratic deﬁcit,
we recommend being cautious in setting the precise rules for such a system should it be used in future European
Parliament elections.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. For more information on the article, see the author’s recent paper in European
Union Politics (co-authored with Philipp Harfst, André Blais, Sona Golder, Jean-François Laslier, Laura Stephenson,
and Karine Van der Straeten).
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